For close to a century now, the Middle East has been a restive and volatile region with inter-state conflicts a regular feature till the 1990s before the strife morphed into intra-state clashes, with some rare exceptions. However, in 2024, the ongoing conflict in Gaza and the Israeli-Lebanese border is threatening to widen into a larger war in the wake of the Tehran assassination.
The assassination of Hamas political bureau chief Ismail Haniyeh in the Iranian capital, a few hours after he attended the inauguration ceremony of President Masoud Pezeshkian, has left the Iranian regime threatening Israel, which it blames for the incident, with “harsh punishment.”
The situation has been further exacerbated with the Hezbollah in Lebanon also vowing vengeance for the simultaneous assassination of its top operative Fuad Shukr in a Beirut airstrike.
However, there has been only plenty of hot rhetoric so far from Iran, which is seeking to bolster support from Arab nations and other countries before its planned strike — with the Jordanian Foreign Minister in Tehran on Sunday for discussions — as well as ratchet up apprehension in Israel.
As part of these mind games, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organisation’s former chief Hossein Taeb on Sunday claimed that Iran’s retaliatory response is going to “surprise” Israel.
Addressing a cultural event in Mashhad, he said that the operation that Iran has designed to take revenge will be “surprising” and won’t fall within the framework of the scenarios it can predict.
Significantly, in the discussion on the assassination in the UN Security Council, Iran’s Permanent Representative Amir Saeid Iravani, reserving his country’s “inherent right to self-defence in accordance with international law,” noted that it would respond when “it deems necessary and appropriate.”
The situation is thus different from April when Iran launched a massive drone and missile strike on Israel in response to the attack on its consulate in Syria that left some senior Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) officials dead. Jordan was then among the nations that swung into action to repel the attack — or the part that was in its airspace.
The attack was reportedly intimated to the US and other powers through third parties, but this time, the perceived provocation is bigger, and thus, liable to trigger a larger Iranian retaliation, which is likely to involve its “Axis of Resistance” allies like Hezbollah and the Houthis too.
With the US taking no chances, and rushing additional forces to the region, the situation has become more dire and any miscalculation in strike and response may have consequences that go beyond ostensibly well-calibrated strategies of Generals and politicians in the planning boards and meetings.
Meanwhile, the implications of the assassination are going to have implications that will be more pervasive, long-lasting, and largely negative.
Negotiations for a truce in Gaza are more or less stymied given the absence of Haniyeh, one of the key negotiators for Hamas, as well as the reluctance of Egypt and Qatar, the lead facilitators for the negotiations, to associate themselves further in the process in view of such “reckless” behaviour targeting the participants.
In Israel, the beleaguered Benjamin Netanyahu government can exult in the welcome optics of netting a brace of high-profile Hamas and Hezbollah targets, but will face more problems in the long run with more intractable — and invisible — foes to confront.
With Haniyeh, considered a pragmatist, if not moderate, and open to political solutions, no more there, the Hamas mantle could switch back to shadowy — and more unrestrained — figures like Yahya Sinwar, perceived as the mastermind of the October 7, 2023 attacks, or other leaders, who may be more unpredictable.
Haniyeh is likely to be replaced as political bureau chief with his predecessor, the more hawkish Khaled Meshal, himself the target of a bungled Israeli assassination plot decades back, and who has already staked out a maximalist position by refusing to recognise Israel.
On the larger canvas, the US, which has rushed reinforcements, will have to keep its attention and energy focussed on the Middle East – a situation that will be welcomed by geopolitical rivals China and Russia, as the US continues to be involved, or rather stuck, in the region’s volatile vortex, and will find it difficult to concentrate forces elsewhere.
Finally, the impact of a larger war in the oil-producing hub if all the sabre-rattling, and the retaliation and counter-retaliation, go out of control, could wreak havoc for the world, with the impact on production and transport of fuel supplies, given the chokepoints on both sides of the Arabian peninsula.
The consequences of any misstep by actors — regional or global — are too horrible to contemplate even as the prospects of a diplomatic settlement appear remote. AGENCIES
